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THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC ABORTION
FUNDING DECISIONS ON INDIGENT WOMEN:
A PROPOSAL TO REFORM STATE STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL ABORTION FUNDING PROVISIONS
Carole A. Corns*
In the 1973 decision of Roe v. Wade,1 the United States
Supreme Court overturned a Texas statute that had
criminalized all abortions except those necessary to save the
life of a pregnant woman.2 For the first time,3 the Court
recognized the constitutional status of a woman's right to
choose abortion over maternity, holding that her choice, if
exercised prior to fetal viability, was guaranteed by a funda-
mental right to privacy.4 It was a pyrrhic victory for women's
rights, however. By framing the right to procreative choice as
a privacy right, the Court limited the extent of that right
because privacy implies only freedom from government inter-
vention, a negative right.5 In subsequent cases, the Supreme
Court denied that the constitutional abortion right enumerated
in Roe was absolute, holding that neither a state6 nor the
* Contributing Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume
24, 1991. B.S., Indiana University, 1985; J.D., University of Michigan Law School,
expected 1991.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. Id. at 164.
3. See Choper, Consequences of Supreme Court Decisions Upholding Individual
Constitutional Rights, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1, 183 (1984) (noting that "[als recently as
1967, just six years before the foundation ruling in Roe v. Wade, no state in the
nation permitted an abortion except to save the life of the mother" (footnotes
omitted)).
4. Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-64. Specifically, the Court concluded that "the right of
personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but that this right is not unqualified
and must be considered against important state interests in regulation." Id. at 154.
The Court concluded that the State's interest in regulating the pregnancy becomes
"compelling" at approximately the end of the first trimester, both because the health
risk of continuing a pregnancy outweighs that of obtaining an abortion during the
first trimester and because the state's interest in protecting "potential" human life
arises at the point of fetal viability. Id. at 163-64.
5. For a critical analysis of the limitations of the constitutional right to privacy
within the context of the right to abortion, see C. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED
93-102 (1987). For a discussion of the distinction between equal protection based
gender discrimination cases and due process based reproductive anatomy cases, see
Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63
N.C.L. REV. 375, 375-80 (1985).
6. See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,469-80 (1977) (upholding a Pennsylvania law
limiting the use of Medicaid funding for abortions to "medically necessary" abortions).
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federal government 7 had a positive responsibility to ensure
that each woman seeking an abortion would be able, financial-
ly, to obtain one.
Specifically, the Court ruled that state governments, under
their respective Medicaid plans, could withhold funding from
indigent women seeking elective abortions, even though the
states continued to provide for their childbirth-related expens-
es.' Three years later, the Court ruled that the federal
government could prohibit indigent women from using federal
Medicaid funds for abortions.9 Rejecting equal protection
challenges in both cases, the Court held that: 1) neither
pregnancy nor poverty constituted a suspect classification, so
the State was not required to show a compelling interest to
justify its policy;1" and 2) the regulations at issue were
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest in
encouraging childbirth.11
State and federal restrictions on Medicaid funding for
pregnant women, which reflect governmental preferences for
childbirth over abortion, 2 operate to coerce some indigent
women into maternity. 3 An indigent woman who faces the
options of using her welfare check to pay for an abortion or of
obtaining government funding to carry her pregnancy to term
has a choice between abortion and childbirth, but her freedom
to make that choice is questionable. 4 Except in the few
7. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980) (upholding an amendment
to a federal appropriations bill that banned the use of federal Medicaid funds to pay
for abortions, except where necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman).
8. Maher, 432 U.S. at 478-80.
9. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316-18.
10. Harris, 448 U.S. at 322-23; Maher, 432 U.S. at 470-71.
11. Harris, 448 U.S. at 324-26; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-80 (1977).
12. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) ("[T]he Hyde Amendment, by
encouraging childbirth except in the most urgent circumstances, is rationally related
to the legitimate governmental objective of protecting potential life."); IND. CODE
§ 16-10-3-4 (Supp. 1979) ("Childbirth is preferred, encouraged, and supported over
abortion."); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-01 (1981) ("Between normal childbirth and
abortion, it shall be the policy of the State of North Dakota that normal childbirth is
to be given preference, encouragement, and support by law and by state action .... ");
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1991) ("Since it is the public policy of the
Commonwealth to favor childbirth over abortion, no Commonwealth funds ... shall
be expended by any State or local government agency for the performance of abortion
[except under specific circumstances]."); cf. Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 445 (1977)
("The State has a valid and important interest in encouraging childbirth."); Maher,
432 U.S. at 477 (stating that "a State is not required to show a compelling interest
for its policy choice to favor normal childbirth").
13. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 483 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14. See generally Henshaw & Wallisch, The Medicaid Cutoff and Abortion
Services for the Poor, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 170 (1984) (discussing problems
experienced by indigent women in obtaining funds for an abortion).
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states that continue to fund abortions for Medicaid-eligible
women,1 5 restrictive state and federal abortion funding
decisions have limited the right to procreative choice to those
women who can afford to pay for an abortion.' 6
This Note argues that state legislatures should relax
funding restrictions on abortions for indigent women and
proposes specific mechanisms to ensure the equal protection
of indigent women in the abortion context. Part I briefly
recounts the history of federal funding for abortions, from the
liberal post-Roe funding scheme to the restrictive funding
arrangements that have prevailed since the early 1980s. Part
II surveys the existing literature and discusses patterns of
state funding and the impact of funding restrictions on
indigent women seeking abortions. This literature shows that
the tightening of state funding policies subsequent to the
federal Medicaid restrictions has inflicted physical and
economic hardships on these women. Part III examines state
funding trends by reviewing the states' legislative, judicial and
popular responses to the abortion funding issue. Although a
few state courts have overturned restrictive state laws and
mandated the funding of abortions for indigent women 7 and
a few state legislatures have provided for such funding,'" the
majority of states have imposed and maintained severe restric-
tions upon the funding of Medicaid abortions. 9 Part IV
argues that it is the states' responsibility to fund abortions
sought by indigent women to prevent the negative economic
impact and detriment to health and welfare that occurs when
these women are prevented from terminating their pregnan-
cies. This Part concludes by recommending a model state
constitutional amendment and a statute that state legislatures
could enact to ensure that welfare agencies exercise their
responsibility to fund abortions for indigent women to protect
the rights of indigent women to choose between childbirth and
abortion.2 °
15. See infra note 78.
16. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 483 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[T]his
coercion [to bear children a woman would not otherwise choose to have] can only
operate upon the poor, who are uniquely the victims of this form of financial
pressure.").
17. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 78, 80 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
20. A discussion of the morality of abortion is beyond the scope of this Note. For
an analysis of the moral and ethical arguments for and against abortion, see
WINTER 1991]
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF STATE AND
FEDERAL FUNDING FOR ABORTIONS
In 1965 Congress established the Medicaid program, a
federal-state cost-sharing program designed to fund medical
care for indigent persons. 2' Title XIX of the Social Security
Act authorizes the use of federal funds to reimburse states for
expenditures for a broad range of medical services.22 States
participating in the Medicaid program are free to develop their
own plans and consequently set their own limitations as long
as they are consistent with the objectives of the Medicaid
program.23 If the state establishes a Medicaid plan that
ABORTION PARLEY (J. Burtchaell ed. 1980) and THE ETHICS OF ABORTION: PRO-LIFE!
VS. PRO-CHOICE! (R. Baird and S. Rosenbaum eds. 1989).
Some taxpayers who believe that abortion is immoral or unethical object to the use
of tax monies to finance abortion. Segers, Political Discourse and Public Policy on
Funding Abortion: An Analysis, in ABORTION PARLEY, supra, at 275-76. On the other
hand, a taxpayer might be morally opposed to abortion, and yet support Medicaid
funding for abortion on equality grounds as long as abortion continues to be legal.
See, e.g., Callahan, The Court and a Conflict of Principles, HASTINGS CENTER REP.,
Aug. 1977, at 7. A moral or religious objection to the use of tax monies to finance
abortion does not, however, relieve the taxpayer of having to pay taxes. The Supreme
Court has held that "religious belief in conflict with the payment of taxes affords no
basis for resisting the tax." United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982) (upholding
the imposition of social security taxes on the Old Order Amish despite religious
objections to paying this type of tax).
21. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, tit. I, § 121(a),
79 Stat. 343 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396s (1988)).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988) provides the following authorization for appropria-
tions:
For the purpose of enabling each State, as far as practicable under the
conditions in such State, to furnish (1) medical assistance on behalf of families
with dependent children and of aged, blind, or disabled individuals, whose
income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary medical
services, and (2) rehabilitation and other services to help such families and
individuals attain or retain capability for independence or self-care, there is
hereby authorized to be appropriated for each fiscal year a sum sufficient to
carry out the purposes of this subchapter. The sums made available under this
section shall be used for making payments to States which have submitted, and
had approved by the Secretary, State plans for medical assistance.
23. See id. § 1396a(a)(17) (requiring state plans to include "reasonable standards
..for determining eligibility for and the extent of medical assistance under the plan
which ... are consistent with the objectives of this subchapter"). See also Mechanic,
The Supreme Court and Abortion: 2. Sidestepping Social Realities, HASTINGS CENTER
REP., Dec. 1980, at 17, 17 (noting that "[flederal regulation did allow ... for states
to 'place appropriate limits on a service based on such criteria as medical necessity
or on utilization control procedures.'").
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satisfies certain statutory requirements24 and meets with
federal approval,25 the federal government agrees to pay a
specified percentage of the total amount spent under the state
plan.26
Public funding of abortions under the Medicaid program
began during the Nixon administration, when the Department
of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) began to reimburse
states for expenditures made to provide abortions to indigent
women. 27  The federal government's decision to provide
Medicaid funding for abortions reflected the administration's
recognition of abortion as a legitimate form of medical treat-
ment.2" In addition to decriminalizing abortion, the 1973
United States Supreme Court decision of Roe v. Wade29
apparently legitimized the status of abortion as a medical
procedure within the context of the Medicaid program. 0
Subsequently, the "pro-life" movement began to lobby state
and federal legislators, arguing that tax monies should not be
used to finance abortions.3' The states of Pennsylvania32
and Connecticut33 adopted regulations proscribing the funding
of elective abortions but permitting the funding of "medically
necessary" abortions through their state Medicaid pro-
grams.34 In addition, the Mayor of St. Louis, Missouri issued
a policy directive prohibiting the use of municipal hospitals to
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a) (1988).
25. See id. § 1396a(b).
26. See id. § 1396b(a).
27. Noonan, The Supreme Court and Abortion: 1. Upholding Constitutional
Principles, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1980, 14, 14.
28. Id.
29. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
30. Noonan, supra note 27, at 14.
31. Ginsburg, supra note 5, at 381-82; see also Vinovskis, The Politics ofAbortion
in the House of Representatives in 1976, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1790, 1791 (1979).
32. The Pennsylvania regulation defined abortions as "medically necessary" if,
among other conditions, documented medical evidence indicated that continuing the
pregnancy might threaten the health of the pregnant woman, that the infant might
be born with an incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency, or that, where
the pregnancy resulted from statutory or forcible rape or incest, the continuance of
the pregnancy might threaten the mental or physical health of the pregnant woman.
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 441 n.3 (1977) (citing 3 Pa. Bull. 2207, 2209 (Sept. 29,
1973)).
33. The Connecticut regulation's definition of "medically necessary" was less
specific than Pennsylvania's, but included "psychiatric necessity." See Maher v. Roe,
432 U.S. 464, 466 (1977) (citing 3 CONNECTICUT WELFARE DEPARTMENT PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM MANUAL, ch. III, § 275 (1975)).
34. Id. (Connecticut regulation); Beal, 432 U.S. at 443-45 (Pennsylvania
regulation).
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provide abortions, except where necessary to save the life of
the pregnant woman or to protect her from grave physical
injury.3 5
In 1976, Representative Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.) proposed an
amendment to the fiscal year 1977 appropriations bill for the
Departments of Labor and HEW (the "Hyde Amendment") that
would have prevented any funds under the act from being used
"to pay for abortions or to promote or encourage abortions."
3 6
The House of Representatives passed the amendment by a
vote of 209 to 165," 7 but the Senate defeated it by a vote of 53
to 35.3 In response to the Senate defeat, Representative
Silvio 0. Conte (R-Mass.) proposed, 3 and the House ap-
proved,4" a "compromise" amendment that proscribed federal
funding for abortions except where the pregnancy endangered
the life of the pregnant woman.41 Apparently appeased by
this exception, the Senate approved the revised version of the
Hyde Amendment.42 Three weeks after Congress adopted the
appropriations bill, however, a federal district judge, in McRae
v. Mathews,4 3 enjoined the enforcement of the Hyde Amend-
ment, and directed HEW to continue to provide federal
Medicaid reimbursement to providers of elective abortions.44
Judge John F. Dooling of the Eastern District of New York
reasoned that withdrawing funds for elective abortions
resulted in denial of medical assistance to indigent women
solely because of their choice to exercise a constitutionally
protected right.4"
The following year, in a triumvirate of decisions, the
Supreme Court upheld the above-mentioned Pennsylvania and
Connecticut regulations and the St. Louis policy directive. In
35. Doe v. Poelker, 497 F.2d 1063, 1065 n.1 (8th Cir. 1974) (documenting the
policy), rev'd per curiam, 432 U.S. 519 (1977). See also Noonan, supra note 27, at 14.
36. 122 CONG. REC. 20,410 (1976).
37. Id. at 20,412-13.
38. Id. at 27,680.
39. See id. at 30,895-96.
40. Id. at 30,901-02.
41. Id. at 30,895.
42. Id. at 30,997. The modified version of the Hyde Amendment was eventually
enacted as the Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropria-
tion Act, 1977. Department of Labor Appropriation Act, 1977, Pub. L. No. 94-439,
§ 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434 (1976).
43. 421 F. Supp. 533 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated and remanded sub nom. Califano
v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977).
44. Id. at 543; see also Noonan, supra note 27, at 14.
45. 421 F. Supp. at 541-42.
376
Abortion Funding Decisions
the first case, Beal v. Doe,4" the Court held that states
participating in the Medicaid program had the discretion
under the Social Security Act to refuse to fund abortions that
were not medically necessary.47 The Court next held, in
Maher v. Roe,4" that a state participating in the Medicaid
program was not constitutionally compelled to fund elective
(nontherapeutic) abortions, even if the state chose to fund
childbirth.49 The Court rejected the plaintiffs' due process
and equal protection claims, stating that indigency is not a
suspect classification" and that the Pennsylvania and Con-
necticut regulations bore a rational relationship to each state's
"'strong and legitimate interest in encouraging normal child-
birth."' 51 Finally, in Poelker v. Doe,52 the Court held that
states and cities need not provide public employees or facilities
to perform nontherapeutic abortions.53
The district court in Mathews, which broadly invalidated all
funding restrictions imposed on abortions, had held that the
constitutional right to abortion would be frustrated even by
the withholding of federal funds for elective abortions.54
Because the Supreme Court's decisions in Beal and Maher
clearly repudiated this argument, and because the district
court failed to distinguish between the funding of therapeutic
and nontherapeutic abortions, the district court's order could
no longer stand. The Supreme Court vacated the district
court's order and remanded the case for further consideration
in light of Maher and Beal." In conformance with the
language of the Hyde Amendment, HEW began to withhold
Medicaid funding from all women seeking abortions unless the
women's pregnancies were life-threatening.56 Subsequent
46. 432 U.S. 438 (1977) (upholding as consistent with the Social Security Act a
Pennsylvania regulation that limited the funding of abortions by the state Medicaid
program to those abortions that the state considered "medically necessary").
47. Id. at 444-47.
48. 432 U.S. 464 (1977) (upholding the constitutionality of a Connecticut
regulation that limited the funding of abortions by the state Medicaid program to
those abortions which the state considered "medically necessary").
49. Id. at 478-80.
50. Id. at 470-71.
51. Id. at 478 (quoting Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446 (1977)).
52. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
53. Id. at 521.
54. McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533, 540-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), vacated and
remanded sub nom. Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977).
55. See Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977).
56. See 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.201-441.208 (1978) (implementing the Hyde
Amendment's prohibition against abortion funding).
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versions of the Hyde Amendment for most of fiscal year
197817 and all of fiscal year 197958 were somewhat less
restrictive, permitting the federal government to fund abor-
tions when the life of the pregnant woman was endangered;
where two doctors certified that continuation of the pregnancy
would result in severe and long-lasting health damage; or
when the pregnancy was the result of a reported rape or
incest.5 9 The 1980 version deleted the exception for severe
and long lasting health damage.6"
On January 15, 1980, the federal district judge who decided
Mathews"1 enjoined once again the enforcement of the Hyde
Amendment, this time on the grounds that the denial of
federal Medicaid funds for medically necessary abortions
constituted an "unduly burdensome interference with the
pregnant woman's freedom to decide to terminate her pregnan-
cy when appropriate concern for her health makes that course
medically necessary."62 Thus, the district court eventually
did distinguish between medically necessary and elective
abortions in its attempt to sustain the challenge to the Hyde
Amendment.
This second injunction against enforcement of the Hyde
Amendment, however, was ultimately futile. On June 30,
1980, in Harris v. McRae,63 the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, 64 rejecting the
argument that the restriction on funding obstructed the
exercise of a woman's interest in terminating her pregnancy
and thus infringed on her personal liberty.6" Relying on
57. Act of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977). The
appropriations for HEW during October and November 1977, the first two months of
fiscal year 1978, were provided by joint resolutions that continued in effect the 1977
version of the Hyde Amendment. Act of Nov. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-165, 91 Stat.
1323 (1977); Act of Oct. 13, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-130, 91 Stat. 1153 (1977).
58. Departments of Labor and Health, Education, and Welfare Appropriations
Act, 1979. Department of Labor Appropriation Act, 1979, Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210,
92 Stat. 1567, 1586 (1978).
59. Id.; Act of Dec. 9, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460 (1977).
60. Act of Nov. 20, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926 (1979).
61. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
62. McRae v. Califano, 491 F. Supp 630, 737 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd sub nom. Harris
v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
63. 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
64. Id. at 322 (stating that "the Hyde Amendment violates no constitutionally
protected substantive rights" nor is it "predicated on a constitutionally suspect
classification").
65. Id. at 312-17.
378
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Maher", the majority held that the government, rather than
obstructing a woman's right to an abortion, merely "by means
of unequal subsidization of abortion and other medical
services, encourages alternative activity deemed in the public
interest. 67  Finally, the Court held that Title XIX did not
require states to pay for medically necessary abortions for
which federal reimbursement was unavailable.68 On the
same day, in Williams v. Zbaraz,69 the Supreme Court held
that states imposing the same funding restrictions as the
Hyde Amendment did not violate the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. 70 Thus, states constitutionally
could refuse to fund medically necessary abortions that were
not funded by the federal government.
After the implementation and enforcement of the Hyde
Amendment, states had to decide whether to pay for medically
necessary abortions in non-life-threatening cases even though
they would not be reimbursed by the federal government.
Most states responded by sharply restricting the funding of
abortions under their respective Medicaid programs. 71 Aside
from political pressure by "pro-life" groups, states were
undoubtedly influenced by the cost of funding such abortions
themselves. Although the cost of funding abortions for
indigent women is less than that of funding expenses incident
to birth and childcare,72 the difference in federal contribution
toward these expenses is a crucial factor: the state would be
obliged to pay the entire bill for the former expense, while the
federal government would subsidize the latter expense heavily.
73
66. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
67. Harris, 448 U.S. at 315.
68. Id. at 311.
69. 448 U.S. 358 (1980).
70. Id. at 369.
71. ALAN GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, ABORTIONS AND THE POOR: PRIVATE MORALITY,
PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 6 (1979) [hereinafter ABORTIONS AND THE POOR]. The Alan
Guttmacher Institute is a non-profit organization that studies family planning and
reproductive issues and publishes the monthly magazine Family Planning Perspectives.
For a current listing of state statutes and regulations see infra notes 76-78.
72. See Torres, Donovan, Dittes & Forrest, Public Benefits and Costs of
Government Funding for Abortion, 18 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 111, 117 (1986) (showing
that the taxpayer burden from the Medicaid funding of expenses related to childbirth
and childcare is over four times that of the Medicaid funding of abortions).
73. Cf. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980) ("By subsidizing the medical
expenses of indigent women who carry their pregnancies to term while not
subsidizing the comparable expenses of women who undergo abortions ... Congress
has established incentives that make childbirth a more attractive alternative than
abortion for persons eligible for Medicaid." (footnote omitted)).
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The final version of the Hyde Amendment, passed in 1981,
contains the restrictive language of the original "compromise"
Hyde Amendment.7 4 Since fiscal year 1981, federal funding
in the abortion context has been limited to situations in which
the life of the pregnant woman is endangered.75  State
legislatures and Medicaid administrations have tended to
follow the federal government's lead; the majority of states
have embraced the restrictive life-threatening only language
of the most recent version of the Hyde Amendment.76 A few
74. Supplemental Appropriations and Rescission Act, 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-12,
§ 109, 95 Stat. 14, 96 (1981).
75. Gold & Guardado, Public Funding of Family Planning, Sterilization and
Abortion Services, 1987, 20 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 228, 233 (1988).
76. These states are: Alabama, see ALA. MEDICAID AGENCY ADMIN. CODE
r. 560-x-6.09(1)(b) (Supp. 1990); Arizona, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 35-196.02
(1990); Arkansas, see ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 1; Colorado, see COLO. CONST. art. V,
§ 50; Delaware, see DIVISION OF SOC. SERVS., DEL. DEP'T OF HEALTH & SOC. SERVS.,
DELAWARE MEDICAID PROVIDER MANUAL 33 (July 1990); Florida, see FLA. ADMIN.
CODE ANN. r. 1OC-7.038(5)(a)9 (1986); Georgia, see GEORGIA DEP'T OF MED. ASSIS-
TANCE, POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR PHYSICIAN SERVICES PART II § 904.2 (Oct. 1,
1989); Illinois, see ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23 para. 6-1 (1989); Indiana, see IND. CODE
§ 16-10-3-3 (Supp. 1979); Kansas, see KANSAS DEP'T OF SOC. AND REHABILITATION
SERVS., PHYSICIAN PROVIDER MANUAL sec. 8400 (Sept. 1990); Kentucky, see KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 205.560(1), (6) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1991), KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.715
(Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); Louisiana, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-1299.34.5 (West
Supp. 1990); Maine, see BUREAU OF MED. SERVS., MAINE DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS.,
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL ch. II § 90.05-2A (1981); Massachusetts, see MASS.
GEN. L. ch. 29, § 20B (1988); Michigan, see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.109a (West
1988); Mississippi, see MISSISSIPPI DIV. OF MEDICAID, MEDICAL SERVICES MANUAL ch.
6 C(3) (Aug. 1990); Missouri, see MO. REV. STAT. § 188.205 (1986); Montana, see
MONT. ADMIN. R. 46.12.2002(e)(i) (1990); Nebraska, see MEDICAL SERVS. DIV.,
NEBRASKA DEP'T OF SOC. SERVS., PROGRAM MANUAL § 18-004.08 (Nov. 19, 1982);
Nevada, see NEVADA STATE WELFARE DIV., MEDICAID PROVIDER BULLETIN, BULL. No.
331, at 1 (June 1, 1988); New Hampshire, see N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. sec. He-W
504.06(c) (1990); New Jersey, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981); New
Mexico, see NEW MEXICO MED. ASSISTANCE DIV., MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM
MANUAL SUPPLEMENT, No. 89-31, para. IX.J (Sept. 1, 1989); North Dakota, see N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.3-01 (1981); Ohio, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5101.55(C)
(Baldwin 1989); Oklahoma, see OKLA. STAT. tit. 56, § 206(C) (Supp. 1990); Rhode
Island, see R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-13-18(a), (c) (1989); South Carolina, see SOUTH
CAROLINA STATE HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. FIN. COMM'N, MEDICAID PROVIDER
MANUAL: PHYSICIAN, CLINICAL, AND ANCILLARY SERVICES para. 211.8(C) (1988);
South Dakota, see S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 28-6-4.5 (1984); Tennessee, see
TENNESSEE MEDICAID PHYSICIAN PROVIDER MANUAL § 307.2 (Apr. 1986); Texas, see
TEXAS DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS., MEDICAID PROVIDER PROCEDURES MANUAL 300 (Sept.
1990); Utah, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-18-10(6) (1989); Vermont, see VERMONT DEP'T
OF SOC. WELFARE, WELFARE ASSISTANCE MANUAL, BULL. No. 80-62, at M617 (1984);
cf. District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-518, § 117,
104 Stat. 2224, 2235 (1990) (Congress imposes Hyde Amendment restrictions on the
District of Columbia). See generally NARAL FOUND./NARAL, WHO DECIDES? A
STATE-BY-STATE REVIEW OF ABORTION RIGHTS 1991 (1991).
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have provided additional exceptions, such as terminations of
pregnancies resulting from rape or incest or involving fetal
abnormality.77 Only eight states voluntarily use state funds
to finance all medically necessary abortions sought by indigent
women.7" Courts in three additional states have relied on state
constitutions to invalidate restrictions on the funding of abor-
tions that are medically necessary but not life-threatening.7 9
77. Four states fund abortions for indigent women only when the women's
pregnancies result from rape or incest, or when the abortion is necessary to prevent
the death of the mother. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 256B.062516 (West Supp. 1991); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. §§ 20.927, 59.07(136),
66.04(1)(m) (1987-88); Wyo. STAT. § 35-6-117 (1988). Idaho provides the additional
exception that the state will fund abortions that are necessary to preserve the
pregnant woman's health. See IDAHO CODE § 56-209c (Supp. 1990). Iowa funds
abortions that result from rape or incest, or are necessary to prevent the mother's
death, and also funds abortions when the fetus is "physically deformed, mentally
deficient, or afflicted with a congenital illness." See IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 441-
78.1(17) (1991). Maryland and Virginia are less restrictive than Iowa; these states
fund most abortions that Iowa would fund, and also provide funding when the
pregnancy is likely to have a serious and adverse effect on the woman's physical or
mental health. See Maryland State Budget for Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 1991,
1990 Md. Laws 1460-61 (ch. 409 line item 32.17.01.03); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-92.1,
.2 (1985) (authorizing funding for abortions when pregnancy results from rape or
incest or when the physician believes the fetus has an "incapacitating physical
deformity or mental deficiency"); VIRGINIA DEP'T OF MED. ASSISTANCE SERVS., PHYSI-
CIAN MANUAL ch. IV, 21-23 (Jan. 1988) (stating that Virginia will fund abortions
when the pregnancy threatens the pregnant woman's health).
78. These states are: Alaska, see ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7, § 43.140(b) (Oct. 1988);
Connecticut, see MEDICAL CARE ADMIN., CONNECTICUT DEP'T OF INCOME MAINTENANCE,
MEDICAL SERVICES POLICY, para. 173G.III.a (1984); Hawaii, see HAW. ADMIN. R. §§ 17-
742.1-10(b), 17-744-48.1(b) (1989); New York, see N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 365a(2)
(McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1991) (defining "medical assistance" and the scope of care,
services and supplies to be provided without restricting abortion funding); North Carolina,
see N.C. ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, r. 42w.0002 (Oct. 1990); Oregon, see OR. ADMIN. R. 461-14-
052 (July 1988); Washington, see DIVISION OF MED. ASSISTANCE, WASHINGTON DEP'T OF
SOC. & HEALTH SERVS., SCHEDULE OF MAXIMUM ALLOWANCES AND PROGRAM DESCRIP-
TIONS, 96a (1990); West Virginia, see NARAL FOUNDATION, supra note 76, at 162 (citing
West Virginia Medicaid Program Regulation MA-85-4 (1985)); see also Sullivan, New York
Judge Rejects State Prenatal Program that Excludes Abortion, N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1991,
at B3, col. 2.
In 1990, the West Virginia Legislature passed a budget bill for fiscal year 1990-91
which restricted public funding of abortions to cases in which continuation of the
pregnancy could result in permanent, catastrophic physical injury to the pregnant woman,
the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest, or continuation of the pregnancy would result
in the birth of a child with permanent physical or mental defects. 1990 W. Va. Acts 229.
West Virginia's Attorney General, however, issued an opinion letter stating that these
limitations are "void and of no effect." Opinion Letter from W.Va. Attorney General Roger
Tompkins to the Honorable Robert Chambers, Speaker of the W. Va. House of Delegates
(June 26, 1990). See generally NARAL FOUNDATION, supra note 76, at 162-65.
79. See Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 646, 417 N.E.2d 387, 397
(1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 318, 450 A.2d 925, 941 (1982); Doe v.
Celani, No. S81-84CnC, slip op. at 19 (Vt. Super. Ct., Chittenden County May 23, 1986).
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California does not restrict the use of public funds for abortion
and provides funding for abortions even when they are purely
elective and of no therapeutic value."
In July 1989, the Supreme Court decided Webster v. Repro-
ductive Health Services,"' which dramatically broadened the
power of states to regulate abortions.8 2 Relying on Maher,3
Poelker,"4 and Harris,5 the Court upheld Missouri's ban on
the use of public facilities for abortions and a prohibition
against public employees performing abortions in the scope of
their employment.8 6 The Court held that the restrictions
imposed upon the pregnant woman's access to abortion were
"rationally related to the legitimate governmental goal of
encouraging childbirth"" and placed "'no governmental obsta-
cle in the path of a woman who chooses to terminate her
pregnancy.'"88 The Court further observed that a woman's
inability to obtain an abortion in a public hospital performed by
a public employee was "considerably less burdensome ... than
indigency," 9 and implied that the restrictions imposed by the
Missouri law were not only consistent with, but more reason-
able than, those previously upheld in Maher and Harris.9 °
80. See Cal. Budget Act of 1990, 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1702, 1946-51 (West) (ch.
467 line item 4260-101-001) (providing funding for California's Medical Assistance
Program without restricting public funding of abortion services); Committee to Defend
Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 284-85, 625 P.2d 779, 798-99, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 866, 885-86 (1981) (holding that state budget allocations which funded childbirth-
related expenses but not abortion-related expenses were unconstitutional under the
California Constitution). See also NARAL FOUNDATION, supra note 76, at 15.
81. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
82. The court upheld a Missouri law which (1) required physicians, prior to
performing abortions, to ascertain the viability of fetuses of more than 20 weeks
gestational age; (2) prohibited abortions of viable fetuses; (3) prohibited the use of
public facilities for performing any abortion not necessary to save the life of the
pregnant woman; and (4) prohibited public employees acting within the scope of their
employment from performing abortions except when necessary to save the life of the
pregnant woman. Id. at 507-20. For press discussion of Webster's broadening of state
power to regulate abortions, see, e.g., Greenhouse, The Year the Court Turned to the
Right, N.Y. Times, July 7, 1989, at Al, col. 2; Brozan, New York Likely to Be Battle-
ground in the War After Webster, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1989, at A16, col. 1; Green-
house, Battle Over; Now, a War, N.Y. Times, July 5, 1989, at Al, col. 4.
83. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
84. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
85. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
86. Webster, 492 U.S. at 507-11.
87. Id. at 508-09.
88. Id. at 509 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980)).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 509-10.
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On October 11, 1989, the House of Representatives con-
curred with a Senate amendment 9' to its 1990 appropriations
bill and voted to expand federal funding of abortions under
Medicaid to cover those pregnancies resulting from rape or
incest.92  President Bush summarily vetoed the bill.93  The
House attempted to override the veto but failed to obtain the
necessary two-thirds vote.94 As a result, appropriations
measures for 1990, like those of the previous nine years,
permitted federal funding of an abortion only when the preg-
nancy endangered the woman's life. 95 The appropriations act
for 1991 contained similar restrictions.96
In May 1991, the Supreme Court handed down its decision
in Rust v. Sullivan,97 which further extended the federal
government's power to regulate abortion by limiting public
expenditures. Specifically, the Court upheld regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Health and Human Services
under Title X of the Public Health Service Act.9" One of the
challenged regulations prohibited abortion-related counseling
or referrals by family planning projects receiving Title X
funds.99 The regulations, which remain effective, require a
project funded by Title X to refer pregnant clients "'for appro-
priate prenatal and/or social services by furnishing a list of
available providers that promote the welfare of the mother
and the unborn child'"'1° and expressly prohibit the project
from referring pregnant clients to abortion providers even on
91. 135 CONG. REC. H6905 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 1989).
92. Id. at H6914.
93. Id. at H7356-57 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1989).
94. Id. at H7482, H7495 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1989).
95. See Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-166, § 204,103 Stat. 1159, 1177
(1989).
96. See Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 101-517, § 203, 104 Stat. 2190,2208
(1990).
97. 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
98. Id. at 1764 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 300-300a-6 (1988)). Title X of the Public
Health Service Act authorizes the Secretary of Health and Human Services to grant
federal funding to establishments providing family planning services. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300(a) (1988). The Act provides that "[n]one of the funds appropriated under [Title
X] shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning." Id.
§ 300a-6.
99. Id. at 1765 (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1989)).
100. Id. (quoting 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(2) (1989)).
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specific request. 1 ' Relying on Maher, °2 Harris,1 °3 and
Webster,10 4 the Rust Court rejected the petitioners' challenge
that the regulations violate a woman's fifth amendment right
to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy.1 5 The Court
reasoned that:
Congress' refusal to fund abortion counseling and advocacy
leaves a pregnant woman with the same choices as if the
government had chosen not to fund family-planning ser-
vices at all. The difficulty that a woman encounters when
a Title X project does not provide abortion counseling or
referral leaves her in no different position than she would
have been if the government had not enacted Title X."°6
II. PATTERNS OF STATE FUNDING AND THE IMPACT
ON INDIGENT WOMEN SEEKING ABORTIONS:
A SURVEY OF EXISTING LITERATURE
During fiscal year 1977, before the Hyde Amendment
became effective, about 294,600 of an estimated 427,300 abor-
tions sought by Medicaid-eligible women were federally funded
through Medicaid.'0 7 Thus, even before the restrictions on
federal funding were implemented, approximately 132,700
women were unable to obtain Medicaid-funded abortions for
reasons including inaccessibility or unavailability of abortion
services l and state policies prohibiting or restricting abor-
tion funding under Medicaid.'0 9
101. Id. (citing 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(3), (5) (1990)).
102. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
103. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
104. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
105. 111 S. Ct. at 1777.
106. Id. The Court noted the petitioners' contention that "most Title X clients are
effectively precluded by indigency and poverty from seeing a health care provider who
will provide abortion-related services," but ruled that the indigency of Title X clients
would not affect the outcome of the case. Id.
107. ABORTIONS AND THE POOR, supra note 71, at 13.
108. Id. Rural, teenage, and nonwhite women were disproportionately affected
by inaccessibility or unavailability. Id. at 13.
109. Id. During 1977, in six states, Medicaid did not pay for any abortions for
eligible women; in another thirteen states, it financed fewer than one-fourth of the
abortions sought by Medicaid-eligible women. Id. at 14.
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Not surprisingly, the Hyde Amendment resulted in a sharp
drop in the number of abortions funded by the federal govern-
ment under Medicaid. During fiscal years 1978 and 1979, the
federal government funded approximately 6,000 abortions.10
Eighty-two percent of these pregnancies threatened the life of
a pregnant woman; 16% threatened to cause long-lasting
damage to her physical health; 2% were the result of rape or
incest.'
Because the Hyde Amendment does not foreclose the
possibility of state-funded abortions under the Medicaid
program,1 2 the responses of individual states are fundamen-
tal to the interests of indigent pregnant women. A 1981 study
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association
(JAMA) estimated that 250,000, or 85%, of the 294,600 women
who obtained federal funding for their abortions in 1977 would
have qualified for state funding if they had had their abortions
during fiscal year 1978.113 Only about 194,000 women, how-
ever, actually used state funds to finance abortions during
fiscal year 1978.114 The study attributed this fact to the
variable character of state funding policies resulting from
differences in interpretation of policy, fluctuations in policy,
and public confusion about availability of state funds.'15
A number of states with sizable populations of
Medicaid-eligible women, including Colorado, Illinois, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania, have changed their funding policies
between 1976 and 1987. Colorado, Illinois, and Ohio have
brought their policies in line with the 1981 Hyde Amendment
policy," 6 and Pennsylvania adopted the Hyde language
with exceptions for rape and incest." 7 As Table I shows, as
110. Cates, The Hyde Amendment in Action: How Did the Restriction of Federal
Funds for Abortion Affect Low-Income Women?, 246 J.A.M.A. 1109, 1110 (1981).
111. Id. at 1110.
112. Id. ("[T]he Hyde Amendment ... was not binding in regard to how states
chose to spend their own funds.").
113. Id.
114. Id. In estimating the number of abortions sought by indigent women during
1978, the study assumed no increase from the number of abortions they sought in
1977. Based on the 1977 information, the study estimated that 295,000 women would
be "at risk" of an unwanted pregnancy during 1978. Id. at 1109.
115. Id. at 1111.
116. See Act of June 4, 1985 ch. 230, 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 948 (became law without
the Governor's signature) (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 26-4-105.5, 26-15-104.5 (1989));
Act adopted Nov. 17, 1977, Pub. Act No. 80-1091, 1977 Ill. Laws 3246-49 (Governor's veto
overridden Nov. 17, 1977) (codified as amended at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, paras. 5-5(17),
6-1, 7-1 (1989)); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 5101:3-17-01(A) (1990) (effective Nov. 12, 1980).
117. Act approved Dec. 19, 1980, Pub. L. No. 239, § 1, 1980 Pa. Laws 1321, 1321-22
(codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1991)).
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TABLE I
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF PUBLICLY FUNDED ABORTIONS IN
FISCAL YEARS (FY) 1977 AND 1987






























NEW HAMPSHIRE 200 0
NEW JERSEY 11,000 10,422
NEW MEXICO 500 1
NEW YORK 50,000** 53,495
NORTH CAROLINA 1,500 4,205





RHODE ISLAND 700 0
SOUTH CAROLINA 1,000 8












t As of 1977, Arizona had not yet established a Medicaid program.
* Fiscal Year 1976
** Calendar Year 1976
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a result of these changes, the number of publicly funded
abortions in these states declined markedly between 1976 and
1987.118 As of 1991, Michigan and the District of Columbia,
both of which provided abortion funding in 1987, no longer do
so. 119 These two jurisdictions accounted for 24,421 of the
state-funded abortions performed in 1987.120
The JAMA study estimated that among the pregnant,
Medicaid-eligible women residing in states with restrictive
funding policies, no more than 5% would resort to illegal or
self-induced abortions.121 The study estimated that 20% of
the Medicaid-eligible women in these states continued their
unwanted pregnancies to term.122 Given the number of
states that have restricted Medicaid funding for abortions in
the last decade, 121 the actual number of women who are
forced to consider these undesirable alternatives is likely to
have grown since the 1981 study.
A 1984 study conducted by the Alan Guttmacher Institute
investigated the financial and physical impact of the funding
restrictions on indigent women. 12 4 The study revealed that
38% of the Medicaid-eligible women surveyed postponed their
abortions because of difficulties in obtaining money for the
118. This table is distilled from tables appearing in ABORTIONS AND THE POOR,
supra note 71, at 17, and Gold & Guardado, supra note 75, at 232. Updated statistics
regarding state and federal funding for fertility control services, including abortion,
contraception and sterilization are scheduled to appear in the September-October
1991 issue of Family Planning Perspectives, published by the Alan Guttmacher
Institute, New York, N.Y.
119. See Act of June 23, 1987, Pub. L. No. 59, 1987 Mich. Pub. Acts 196, 1759
(effective Mar. 30, 1988) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.109a (West
1988)); District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-462, § 117, 102
Stat. 2269, 2269-9 (1988); see also Gold & Guardado, supra note 75, at 233 (stating
that Appropriations Act caused an abrupt change in the District of Columbia's
abortion funding policy). The Michigan Court of Appeals has invalidated the statute
that bars funding for abortions, see Doe v. Director of the Dep't of Social Servs., 187
Mich. App. 493, 468 N.W.2d 862, appeal docketed, Nos. 91092, 91093, 1991 Mich.
LEXIS 1593, 1991 WL 158155 (Mich. July 23, 1991), but the Michigan Department
of Social Services continues to refuse to pay for abortions pending appeal of the
decision, see Pluta, Abortion Funding Ban Question Goes to Supreme Court, United
Press Int'l, July 25, 1991 (LEXIS, Nexis Library); see also infra notes 180-86 and
accompanying text.
120. See supra Table 1.
121. Cates, supra note 110, at 1111.
122. Id. Based on studies performed in Georgia, Ohio, and Texas showing that
18% to 35% of Medicaid-eligible pregnant women continued their unwanted
pregnancies to term, Cates estimated that 9,000 of the estimated 45,000 such women
living in restricted states had carried their unwanted pregnancies to term. Id.
123. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
124. Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 14.
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abortion and its accompanying expenses.125 The average
delay among these women was two to three weeks.126 Be-
cause the risk of complications from an abortion increases
sharply after the eighth week of pregnancy, a delay of this
length could have serious physical consequences for the
pregnant woman. 127 The study also showed that almost half
(44%) of the indigent women surveyed financed their abortions
at least in part with money intended for basic living expenses
(food, clothing, and shelter), incurring personal and family
hardships as a result of their decisions. 12' The cost of an
abortion at the clinic used in the study averaged 66% of the
indigent women's monthly household income after rental
payments. 
129
But indigent women are not alone in suffering the economic
consequences of the Hyde Amendment and its state succes-
sors. In 1986, the Alan Guttmacher Institute performed a
state-by-state analysis of the burden imposed on taxpayers as
a result of using taxpayer dollars to pay for abortions.
130
The study found that for every tax dollar spent to pay for
abortions for indigent women, more than four dollars are
saved in public expenses, such as Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, that would have been incurred had the
pregnancy been carried to term. 31
III. TRENDS IN STATE FUNDING: LEGISLATIVE,
JUDICIAL AND POPULAR RESPONSES BY STATES
After the Hyde Amendment restricted federal funding for
abortions by authorizing federal funding only in
life-endangering situations, many states instituted their own
125. Id. at 178.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 178-79.
129. Id. at 178. The average cost of a first-trimester abortion at the clinic used
in the study was $150, and the indigent women's average monthly household income
after rental payment was $226.
130. Torres, supra note 72 (surveying states to determine the average cost of an
abortion as compared to the average cost of childbirth and childcare expenses).
131. Id. at 117. The study found the average benefit-cost ratio to be 4.3:4.6. Cited
birth-related expenditures include: prenatal care; pediatric care for the first two
years of the child's life; Aid to Families with Dependent Children, food stamps, and
the Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children for the
first two years of the child's life. Id. at 113-17.
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restrictive abortion funding policies. Voter initiatives in
Colorado and Michigan exemplify the drastic policy changes
that swept the nation. Colorado had funded Medicaid abor-
tions since 1969,132 but in 1984 voters passed an amendment
to the state constitution to proscribe state funding of abortions
except when a pregnancy threatened a woman's life.1 33  In
1987, after a succession of Michigan governors had vetoed
legislative attempts to restrict abortion funding, 134 Michigan
voters brought an initiative petition which, upon taking effect,
restricted state funding of Medicaid abortions to
life-threatening situations. 135  In October 1988, Congress
enacted legislation prohibiting the District of Columbia from
using its own funds to finance abortions for Medicaid-eligible
women. 136 In 1989 President Bush vetoed attempts by the
House of Representatives to expand abortion funding by the
District of Columbia to pregnancies resulting from rape or
incest.
13 7
A few states, on the other hand, have steadfastly maintained
policies that support abortion funding. Of the twelve states
that continue to finance medically necessary abortions, seven
are authorized to provide such funding by administrative
rules,1 38 and two are expressly authorized to do so by the
state legislature. 139 Continuation of abortion funding in the
remaining three states depends upon the stability of the court
rulings which oblige them to provide such funding.'4 °
132. Torres, supra note 72, at 111.
133. See COLO. CONST. art. 5, § 50; see also Torres, supra note 72, at 111.
134. Church, Five Political Hot Spots, TIME, July 17, 1989, at 64; see also
Stopczynski v. Governor, 92 Mich. App. 191, 195-97, 285 N.W.2d 62, 63-64 (1979)
(documenting legislative attempts to restrict abortion funding and gubernatorial
vetoes).
135. Act of June 23, 1987, Pub. L. No. 59, 1987 Mich. Pub. Acts 196, 1759
(effective Mar. 30, 1988) (codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.109a (West
1988)).
136. See District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1989 Pub. L. No. 100-462, § 117,
102 Stat. 2269, 2269-9 (1988); see also Gold & Guardado, supra note 75, at 233.
137. 135 CONG. REC. H7738 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 1989). The 1990 District of
Columbia Appropriations Act contained the restrictive language of the Hyde
Amendment. District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1990 Pub. L. No. 101-168,
§ 117, 103 Stat. 1267, 1278 (1989).
138. Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, North Carolina, Oregon, Washington, and West
Virginia. See supra note 78.
139. California and New York. See supra notes 78, 80.
140. Court decisions in Massachusetts, New Jersey and Vermont struck down
those states' restrictive abortion funding laws. See Moe v. Secretary of Admin. &
Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 659-60, 417 N.E.2d 387, 405 (1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne,
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An example of a particularly stable court order is the order
issued by the Supreme Court of California, anchored in the
state constitution. In Committee to Defend Reproductive
Rights v. Myers, the Supreme Court of California struck
down the 1978, 1979, and 1980 state budget provisions which
restricted Medi-Cal142 abortion funding to the termination of
pregnancies which resulted from rape, incest, or unlawful
intercourse with a minor; which endangered the life of the
pregnant woman; which threatened severe and long-lasting
health damage to the pregnant woman; or which would result
in the birth of a severely defective infant.14 ' Noting that the
California Constitution is a "'document of independent
force,' ,144 the court held that the right of privacy guaranteed
by the California Constitution was broader than that guaran-
teed by the U.S. Constitution, 4  and that the funding
scheme was an unconstitutional condition upon the exercise of
that right. 4 ' Specifically, the court determined that the
funding scheme was antithetical to the purposes of the
91 N.J. 287, 318, 450 A.2d 925, 941 (1982); Doe v. Celani, No. S81-84CnC, slip op. at
19 (Vt. Super. Ct., Chittenden County May 23, 1986).
Two other states' courts have invalidated restrictive abortion funding provisions,
see Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 252, 285, 625 P.2d
779, 798-99, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 886 (1981); Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 449-
50, 515 A.2d 134, 162 (Super. Ct. 1986), but those states now provide less restrictive
abortion funding under legislative or administrative direction, see Cal. Budget Act
of 1990, 1990 Cal. Legis. Serv. 1702, 1946-51 (West) (ch. 467 line item 4260-101-001)
(providing funding for California's Medical Assistance Program without restricting
public funding of abortion services); MEDICAL CARE ADMIN., CONNECTICUT DEP'T OF
INCOME MAINTENANCE, MEDICAL SERVICES POLICY, para. 173 G.III.a (1984). In
addition, the Michigan Court of Appeals has ruled that Michigan's restrictive funding
statute violates the state's constitution. Doe v. Director of the Dep't of Social Servs.,
187 Mich. App. 493, 534-35, 468 N.W.2d 862, 880, appeal docketed, Nos. 91092,
91093, 1991 Mich. LEXIS 1593, 1991 WL 158155 (Mich. July 23, 1991).
141. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
142. Medi-Cal is California's health care benefits program. CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 14131 (West 1980). See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 14000-14196
(West 1980 & Supp. 1991).
143. 29 Cal. 3d at 258-59, 625 P.2d at 782, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 869 (citing 1978 Cal.
Stat. ch. 359, § 2, item 248, at 823-25; 1979 Cal. Stat. ch. 259, § 2, item 261.5, at 644-
46; 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 510 § 2, item 287.5 at 1146-48).
144. Id. at 261, 625 P.2d at 783, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 870 (quoting People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 549-50, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329
(1975)).
145. See id. at 284, 625 P.2d at 798, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 885. The court held that the
right to procreative choice is "so private and so intimate that each woman in this
state-rich or poor-is guaranteed the constitutional right to make that decision as
an individual, uncoerced by governmental intrusion." Id.
146. Id. at 284-85, 625 P.2d at 798-99, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86.
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Medi-Cal program,147 that the benefits of the restrictions did
not outweigh the impairment of constitutional rights, 148 and
that less offensive means were available to further the state's
objectives.1 49 Finally, the court held that, although the state
was not constitutionally required to finance abortion or child-
birth, once it chose to furnish medical care to indigent women,
it could not withdraw such care solely because a woman chose
to have an abortion. 5 ° Thus, the scope of the privacy right in
the California Constitution was broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision to have an elective abortion. 51
Medicaid funding for medically necessary, but not elective,
abortions in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and New Jersey also
rests on state constitutional grounds.'52 Decisions by courts
in these three states did not address the larger issue of
indigent women seeking elective abortions, however. Thus,
these decisions are considerably narrower in scope than that
of the California Supreme Court.
In Moe v. Secretary of Administration and Finance,'53 the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts invalidated a statute
limiting Medicaid funding of abortion to life-threatening
situations as an impermissible burden upon an indigent
woman's right to privacy and a violation of due process. 54
Noting that the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights "af-
ford[ed] a greater degree of protection to the right asserted
here than does the Federal Constitution as interpreted by
Harris v. McRae,"'55 the court expressed agreement with the
language of Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Harris
that restrictions on funding are coercive financial incentives
which, by favoring childbirth over abortion, deprive indigent
women of their constitutionally guaranteed freedom to choose
abortion over motherhood. 5 The court concluded that once
Massachusetts had chosen to fund the cost of necessary health
147. Id. at 271-73, 625 P.2d at 790-91, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78.
148. Id. at 273-82, 625 P.2d at 791-97, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 878-84.
149. Id. at 282-83, 625 P.2d at 797-98, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 884-85.
150. Id. at 284-85, 625 P.2d at 798, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
151. Id. at 284, 625 P.2d at 798, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
152. See Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 395, 515 A.2d 134, 135 (Super. Ct.
1986); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 659, 417 N.E.2d 387, 404
(1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 293, 450 A.2d 925, 928 (1982).
153. 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981).
154. Id. at 654-55, 417 N.E.2d at 402.
155. Id. at 651, 417 N.E.2d at 400.
156. Id. at 655, 417 N.E.2d at 402 (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 333
(1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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care for pregnant women, it had to do so with "genuine
indifference" to their procreative choices.157
The Superior Court of Connecticut used a similar constitu-
tional analysis to invalidate a funding statute in Doe v.
Maher."'8 The court held that a statute which limited state
funding of Medicaid abortions to life-threatening situations
was unconstitutional as an infringement on the right to
privacy, which encompassed the right to seek an abortion and
the right to preserve one's health.1"9 The court questioned
the logic of Harris v. McRae for upholding the blatant denial
of Medicaid funds for a medically necessary operation, 160 and
gave voice to its belief that the Hyde Amendment was a veiled
attempt by the government to discourage women from exercis-
ing their reproductive rights.1 6' Furthermore, the court held
that the statute violated Connecticut's equal protection
clauses '62 and equal rights amendment1 63 because the stat-
ute denied funding for necessary medical expenses to indigent
women while paying for all necessary medical expenses
incurred by indigent men. 164
In Right to Choose v. Byrne,'65 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey likewise invalidated a statute which denied funding for
medically necessary abortions except where necessary to save
the life of the pregnant woman, but on substantially different
constitutional grounds. First, the court observed that the
right of procreative choice is a fundamental right of all
women.' 6 6 Second, while not finding any state obligation to
fund all abortions,' 67 the court ruled that the state could not
discriminate between indigent women who required a medi-
cally necessary abortion and those who required medical care
incident to childbirth.6 ' Finally, the court held that a
woman's constitutional right to protect her health outweighed
157. Id. at 654, 417 N.E.2d at 402.
158. 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 515 A.2d 134 (Super. Ct. 1986).
159. Id. at 426-32, 515 A.2d at 150-53.
160. Id. at 441-42, 515 A.2d at 157-58.
161. Id. at 437-38, 515 A.2d at 156 (citing Tribe, The Abortion Funding Conun-
drum: Inalienable Rights, Affirmative Duties, and the Dilemma of Dependence, 99
HARv. L. REV. 330, 331 (1985)).
162. CONN. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 20.
163. Id. § 20.
164. 40 Conn. Supp. at 440-49, 515 A.2d at 157-62.
165. 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982).
166. Id. at 305, 450 A.2d at 934.
167. Id. at 304, 450 A.2d at 934.
168. Id. at 305-06, 450 A.2d at 934.
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the state's interest in protecting potential life, 169 and that
the state therefore could not jeopardize the health of an
indigent woman by excluding medically necessary abortions
from Medicaid coverage.
170
In Doe v. Celani,"7' the Vermont Superior Court of
Chittenden County enjoined Vermont's Department of Social
Welfare from denying Medicaid coverage to indigent women
seeking medically necessary abortions.'72 The court over-
turned a regulation promulgated by the Department that tied
the state's abortion funding policy directly to the Hyde Amend-
ment by providing for the funding of abortions "'only under
circumstances for which Federal Financial Participation is
available."'173 The court observed that the Vermont Consti-
tution provided broader protections of individual rights than
did the U.S. Constitution,'74 the former specifically protect-
ing the right to pursue one's safety 75 and prohibiting the
discriminatory provision of governmental benefits.'76 The
court held that by denying indigent pregnant women access to
medically necessary health care, the state impinged upon their
constitutionally guaranteed right to safety. 77 Furthermore,
by singling out and refusing assistance to indigent women
seeking medically necessary abortions, the regulation
impermissibly discriminated in the provision of health care
benefits. 7 ' Finally, the court concluded that the regulation,
by favoring childbirth over abortion at the expense of the
pregnant woman's health, was "antithetical to the medical
assistance purpose of protecting health by equalizing and
facilitating universal access to all medically necessary health
care."
, 179
The most recent state court decision regarding Medicaid
abortion funding was decided in February of 1991. In Doe
v. Director of the Department of Social Services,' the
169. Id. at 306, 450 A.2d at 935.
170. Id. at 310, 450 A.2d at 937.
171. No. S81-84CnC (Vt. Super. Ct., Chittenden County May 23, 1986).
172. Id. slip op. at 19.
173. Id. at 2 (quoting Department of Social Welfare Regulation M617).
174. Id. at 5.
175. Id. at 6 (citing VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1).
176. Id. (citing VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7).
177. Id. at 11.
178. Id. at 11-12.
179. Id. at 16.
180. 187 Mich. App. 493, 468 N.W.2d 862, appeal docketed, Nos. 91092, 91093,
1991 Mich. LEXIS 1593, 1991 WL 158155 (Mich. July 23, 1991).
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Michigan Court of Appeals overturned a voter-initiated statute
that had been adopted in 1988.181 The court held that the
privacy right implicit in the Michigan Constitution afforded
women the fundamental right to an abortion.1 2 The court
also held that the Michigan Constitution's equal protection
clause was broader than the equal protection clause in the
federal Constitution," 3 and that Michigan's equal protection
clause prohibited the imposition of unconstitutional conditions
on women's exercise of their fundamental right to an abor-
tion."8 4 The court then found that the statute impermissibly
burdened indigent women seeking medically necessary abor-
tions in the exercise of their constitutional right to procreative
choice by rendering them the only group of indigent persons
to be denied a medically necessary treatment.8 5 The deci-
sion, however, has been appealed.'
In April 1991, a New York court ruled that New York's
Prenatal Care Assistance Program (PCAP),' a state medi-
cal assistance program funding obstetric and prenatal care for
low-income women who were not eligible for Medicaid, violated
the New York Constitution by failing to fund medically
necessary abortions for women in this group.' Although
PCAP expanded state funding for obstetric and prenatal care
beyond that available under the state Medicaid program,8 9
PCAP did not provide additional funding for abortions. 9 °
This exclusion of abortion funding violated the right to privacy
implicit in the due process clause of the New York Constitu-
tion. '9 The court found that the program, in providing
181. Id. at 534, 468 N.W.2d at 880 (invalidating MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 400.109a (West 1988)).
182. Id. at 508-09, 468 N.W.2d at 869.
183. Id. at 511-18, 468 N.W.2d at 870-73 (citing MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2).
184. Id. at 510, 523-25, 468 N.W.2d at 869-70, 875-76.
185. Id. at 524-25, 468 N.W.2d at 876.
186. See Doe v. Director of the Mich. Dep't of Social Servs., Nos. 91092, 91093,
1991 Mich. LEXIS 1593, 1991 WL 158155 (Mich. July 23, 1991). While the appeal
is pending, the Michigan Department of Social Services has decided to continue its
ban on funding abortions. See Pluta, infra note 119.
187. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2520-2529 (McKinney Supp. 1991).
188. Hope v. Perales, 971 N.Y.S.2d 971, 976-77 (Sup. Ct. 1991).
189. Services funded under PCAP are listed at N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2522
(McKinney Supp. 1991) (abortion services are not funded). New York's Medicaid
program funds medically necessary abortions. See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 365-a(5)(b)
(1983); Donovan v. Cuomo, 126 A.D.2d 305,306-07, 513 N.Y.S.2d 878, 879 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987). Provisions for New York's Medicaid program are codified at N.Y. SOC.
SERV. LAW §§ 363-369 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1991).
190. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2522 (McKinney Supp. 1991) (describing
services available under PCAP).
191. Hope, 971 N.Y.S.2d at 976-77.
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funding for childbirth but not for medically necessary abor-
tions to women who were indigent and not eligible for Medic-
aid, "impermissibly pressures an... indigent woman toward
childbirth" and "bases assistance on conduct, not need."192
The court held that the program violated a provision in the
New York Constitution requiring the state to provide aid, care,
and support to the needy.1 93 The court also held that the
program violated the equal protection clause of the New York
Constitution."' Finally, the court required that, pending
review by the Court of Appeals, the state must fund medically
necessary abortions for women in this group.
195
IV. SUMMARY, ANALYSIS OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS,
AND PROPOSALS FOR STATE LEGISLATIVE AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
In establishing that neither the federal government nor the
states had a constitutional obligation to provide Medicaid
funding for either nontherapeutic abortions or medically
necessary but not life-saving abortions,196 the Supreme
Court did not mention a fundamental corollary, namely, that
states have the discretion to use their own budgets to finance
Medicaid abortions. Indeed, several states have been funding
Medicaid abortions ever since the Supreme Court handed
down its decision in Harris v. McRae. 19 7 The two states with
the greatest populations of Medicaid-eligible women, New
York and California, 98  provide funding for all
Medicaid-eligible women seeking medically necessary abor-
tions. The legislatures and voting populations of several other
populous states, however, have refused to follow the leads of
New York and California. 99
192. Id. at 979.
193. Id. at 981 (citing N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1).
194. Id. at 981-82.
195. Id. at 983.
196. See supra notes 46-70 and accompanying text.
197. See ABORTIONS AND THE POOR, supra note 71, at 22. Cf. supra note 76
(listing states which fund abortions only when necessary to save the pregnant
woman's life).
198. See Torres, supra note 72, at 114.
199. These states include Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio and Pennsylvania.
See supra notes 76-77.
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States which do not provide Medicaid funding can expect
18% to 35% of their Medicaid-eligible female residents seeking
abortions to carry their pregnancies to term.20 0 Up to 5%
more will resort to illegal or self-induced abortions at great
physical risk to themselves.2"1 The remaining women will
manage to pay for an abortion at a private facility, but many
will probably be obliged to use money needed for basic
subsistence expenses. 20 2 Obtaining the money for an abor-
tion is a significant burden for a welfare recipient because an
abortion typically costs about two-thirds of her monthly
welfare payment.20 3
In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,2 °4
the Supreme Court of California determined that such results
run counter to the purposes of the Medi-Cal program, the aim
of which is to provide basic health care to indigent per-
sons. 20 5 The test for provision of such care is that of medical
necessity.20 6 If one accepts the logic of Justice Brennan's
dissent in Beal v. Doe,2 °7 pregnancy is a medical condition
which requires one of two alternative and mutually exclusive
medical solutions: abortion or prenatal care and child-
birth.20 ' From the perspective of a pregnant woman who
does not want to bear a child, abortion is always a medically
necessary procedure.20 9 Under this analysis, the exclusion
of abortion from Medicaid coverage denies indigent women a
necessary medical service.210 This view distinguishes the
Supreme Court of California from other state courts that have
analyzed the issue.
A central factor in the Supreme Court of California's
decision to grant constitutional status to an indigent woman's
right to a publicly funded abortion, in Committee to Defend
211Reproductive Rights v. Myers, was the California Constitu-
tion's specific enumeration of a fundamental right to privacy.
200. See Cates, supra note 110, at 1111.
201. Id.
202. See Henshaw & Wallisch, supra note 14, at 178-80.
203. Id.
204. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 625 P.2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981).
205. Id. at 271-73, 625 P.2d at 790-91, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78 (1981).
206. Id. at 271-72 & n.20, 625 P.2d at 790 & n.20, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 877 & n.20.
207. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
208. Id. at 449 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
209. Id. at 452 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. Id.
211. 29 Cal. 3d 252, 285, 625 P.2d 779, 799, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866, 886 (1981).
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Article I, section 1 states, "All people are by nature free and
independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing,
and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety,
happiness, and privacy."212 The specific guarantee of the
right of privacy in the Declaration of Rights213 of the Califor-
nia Constitution enabled the Supreme Court of California to
interpret this right as being broader than the right of privacy
granted by the U.S. Constitution. 14 Under the "unconsti-
tutional conditions" doctrine applied by the court, the imposi-
tion of a condition (the forfeiture of the constitutional right to
privacy) upon the exercise of a public benefit (the receipt of
Medi-Cal funding) was thus deemed unconstitutional.215
In Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, and New Jersey,
the right to privacy is implicit in the state constitutions but is
not specifically enumerated. By invalidating state statutes
which limited Medicaid funding of abortion to women with
life-threatening pregnancies, the courts in these states relied
upon the implied right of privacy but did not interpret this
right as requiring their respective states to provide Medicaid
funding for elective or nontherapeutic abortions.2" 6 The
most salient difference between the analysis used by the
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Michigan courts and the
analysis used by the Supreme Court of California is that the
Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Michigan courts relied upon
other constitutional grounds, in addition to the implied right
of privacy, to strengthen their opinions. Thus, in Moe v.
Secretary of Administration and Finance,"7 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts interpreted the due process
clause implied in article X of the Massachusetts Constitu-
tion,21 including the implied constitutional right of privacy,
212. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
213. Id. §§ 1-30.
214. 29 Cal. 3d at 262-63, 625 P.2d at 784, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 871.
215. Id. at 270-83, 625 P.2d at 788-99, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 876-85.
216. See Doe v. Maher, 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 423-26, 449-51, 515 A.2d 134, 149-50,
162 (Super. Ct. 1986); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 648-49, 660,
417 N.E.2d 387, 398-99, 405 (1981); Doe v. Director of the Dep't of Social Servs., 187
Mich. App. 493, 507-10, 524, 468 N.W.2d 862, 868-69, 876, appeal docketed, Nos.
91092, 91093, 1991 Mich. LEXIS 1593, 1991 WL 158155 (Mich. July 23, 1991); Right
to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 303-04, 312, 450 A.2d 925, 933-34, 938 (1982).
217. 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981).
218. MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. X.
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to mandate the funding of all medically necessary abor-
tions. 9  In Doe v. Maher,22 ° the Superior Court of Connect-
icut interpreted the due process clause articulated in Article 1,
section 10 of the Connecticut Constitution, encompassing the
right to protect one's health, in a similar manner.22' Finally,
in Doe v. Director of the Department of Social Services,2 22 the
Michigan Court of Appeals ruled that Michigan's equal protec-
tion clause prohibited the state from restricting funding of
medically necessary abortions because such restrictions
limited women's exercise of their constitutional right to
terminate their pregnancies.223
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Right to Choose v.
Byrne,224 also overturned a statute containing restrictive
funding language, but it did so on more fragmented constitu-
tional grounds. Applying article 1, paragraph 1 of the New
Jersey Constitution,225 the court determined that the statute
impinged upon a woman's right to privacy, which is implicitly
guaranteed by this constitutional provision.226 In addition,
by refusing to fund medically necessary abortions under its
Medicaid program while funding childbirth-related expenses,
the state denied equal protection to Medicaid-eligible wom-
en.227  Finally, although the court did not accord the
woman's right to protect her health constitutional status,228
the court gave her right sufficiently high priority to find that
it outweighed the state's interest in protecting potential
life.
229
In contrast, the Vermont Superior Court of Chittenden
County, in Doe v. Celani,23" relied primarily upon the Ver-
mont Constitution's explicit protection of the right to pursue
219. 382 Mass. at 645-50, 659-60, 417 N.E.2d at 398-99, 405-06.
220. 40 Conn. Supp. 394, 515 A.2d 134 (Super. Ct. 1986).
221. Id. at 426, 515 A.2d at 150.
222. 187 Mich. App. 493, 468 N.W.2d 862, appeal docketed, Nos. 91092, 91093,
1991 Mich. LEXIS 1593, 1991 WL 158155 (Mich. July 23, 1991).
223. Id. at 534, 468 N.W.2d at 880 (citing MICH. CONST. art. I, § 2).
224. 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982).
225. Article 1, paragraph 1 reads as follows: "All persons are by nature free and
independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among which are those
of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." N.J. CONST. art. 1,
para. 1.
226. 91 N.J. at 303-06, 450 A.2d at 933-35.
227. Id. at 305-06, 450 A.2d at 934.
228. Id. at 304, 450 A.2d at 934.
229. Id. at 306, 450 A.2d at 935.
230. No. $81-84CnC (Vt. Super. Ct., Chittenden County May 23, 1986).
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one's safety2 3 1 when that court overturned a regulation
denying funding of medically necessary abortions.232 The
court also relied on a provision in the Vermont Constitution
that prohibits the discriminatory provision of governmental
assistance.2 33 Thus, without relying on privacy, due process,
or equal protection provisions, the Vermont court still over-
turned the funding restrictions on constitutional grounds.
Most other states' courts have not grappled with such issues,
and state legislatures and administrations have drastically
reduced the Medicaid funds available to a woman seeking a
non-life-saving abortion. Few state legislatures or administra-
tions have created exceptions to the Hyde Amendment policy,
even for pregnancies which endanger a woman's physical or
mental health, or which result from rape or incest. As a
result, women who will suffer physical or mental harm if they
carry their pregnancies to term are denied the opportunity to
receive government aid for their medically necessary abor-
tions. Regardless of how far one believes the right of privacy
extends, this result is surely antithetical to any state Medicaid
program which has a goal of providing basic medical services
to indigent persons.
The principles of federalism dictate that state constitutions
may provide broader rights guarantees than the federal
Constitution does.234 Constitutional guarantees ensuring the
right of procreative choice are currently provided to indigent
pregnant women in seven states.235 The guarantee of Medic-
aid funding of elective abortion would ensure that indigent
women enjoy the fundamental right to procreative choice
enjoyed by their wealthier female counterparts. The guaran-
tee of Medicaid funding of medically necessary abortions
would fall short of this goal, but would at least ensure that
231. Id. slip op. at 6 (citing VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 1).
232. Id. at 19.
233. Id. at 6 (citing VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7).
234. See, e.g., State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 369 n.6, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (1974);
Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 502-03 (1977).
235. California, see supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text; Connecticut, see
supra notes 158-64 and accompanying text; Massachusetts, see supra notes 153-57
and accompanying text; Michigan, see supra notes 180-85 and accompanying text;
New Jersey, see supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text; New York, see supra
notes 187-95 and accompanying text; Vermont, see supra notes 171-79 and accompa-
nying text.
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indigent women are as free to pursue their fundamental right
to protect their health as their male counterparts are.
Because the right of privacy is not specifically delineated in
most state constitutions, this right is not a reliable guarantor
of the rights of indigent women to protect their health by
obtaining a medically necessary abortion. To guarantee such
rights, most state legislatures would have to implement one of
two possible strategies. The first would be to pass a constitu-
tional amendment. For example, a model constitutional
amendment might read as follows:
Public funds shall be provided through the Medicaid
program to pay for all abortions sought by indigent
women.
The above amendment requires a sympathetic state legislature
and would be difficult to pass. An alternative would be to
model a constitutional amendment after the constitutions of
California or New Jersey. Such an amendment might read as
follows:
All persons are by nature free and independent and
have certain inalienable rights. Among these are
enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring,
possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and
obtaining health, safety, happiness, and privacy.236
Because of the abstract language, such an amendment may be
more politically palatable for legislators.
By expressly delineating the right to privacy, such an
amendment would compel legislatures and courts to regard
that right with such reverence that they would secure that
right by mandating state funding for all abortions sought by
indigent women. One drawback, however, is that this strategy
relies upon an expansive privacy right interpretation that is
rare among the states. A more realistic, but less far-reaching,
solution would be to rely upon equal protection and the right
to pursue one's health, as did New Jersey.237 With the help
236. This proposed constitutional amendment is a synthesis of CAL. CONST. art.
I, § 1 and N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 1, with the addition of an enumerated constitu-
tional right to protect one's health.
237. See Right to Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 305-08, 450 A.2d 925, 934-36
(1982).
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of this model amendment and its provisions for protecting the
health and privacy of indigent women, state courts and legisla-
tures would be able to determine that they must provide
funding for medically necessary abortions sought by indigent
women without being forced to resort to the penumbras of the
state constitution.
Realistically, the success of such an amendment in establish-
ing abortion rights for indigent women depends upon the
interpretive powers of the state courts. An alternative
strategy would be to adopt state legislation or administrative
rules directly addressing the funding of abortions (therapeutic
and nontherapeutic) for the indigent. A possible statute
follows:
The state Department of Welfare [or analogue] is
hereby authorized to provide medical assistance to
all eligible indigent persons regardless of sex.
"Medical assistance" shall mean the payment of part
or all of the cost of care, services, and supplies which
are necessary to prevent, diagnose, correct, or cure
conditions in the person that cause acute suffering,
endanger life, result in illness or infirmity, interfere
with his or her capacity for normal activity, or
threaten some significant handicap.23  "Medical
assistance" shall include reimbursement for all
expenses incident to childbirth or abortion incurred
by indigent women, with genuine indifference to
their reproductive choices.
The above statute provides both general and specific protec-
tion to indigent women seeking abortions. The language in
the first sentence, reminiscent of the Connecticut
Constitution's equal protection clause,239 proscribes state
238. This definition of "medical assistance" was obtained from a New York statute.
See N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 365-a(2) (McKinney 1983). Although the Appellate
Division of New York's Supreme Court has interpreted this statute as excluding
elective (not medically necessary) abortions, it held that the Department's reliance
on a physician's certification of medical necessity as the sole basis for funding was
not improper. See Donovan v. Cuomo, 126 A.D.2d 305, 308-09, 513 N.Y.S.2d 878,
880-81 (1987).
239. That clause reads: "No person shall be denied the equal protection of the law
nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination in the exercise or enjoyment of his
or her civil or political rights because of religion, race, color, ancestry, national origin,
sex or physical or mental disability." CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 20.
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welfare agencies from denying any medically necessary
treatment to indigent women. The second sentence provides
a broad definition of "medical assistance" which would enable
such agencies to provide this funding, consistent with the
goals and objectives of the state Medicaid program. The third
sentence specifically provides for the funding of all abortions
sought by indigent women.
The right to procreative choice, which the United States
Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade24 ° determined to be rooted in
the concept of personal liberty and autonomy, 241 remains
guaranteed by the right to privacy implicit in the federal
constitution despite substantial limitations imposed by
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services.2 42  A woman who
chooses abortion over childbirth is guaranteed the right to
make that choice without unjustified intervention by the
government,243 but is not guaranteed the right to governmen-
tal funding of the abortion.244 The United States Supreme
Court has determined that the funding of childbirth at the
expense of abortion does not violate the equal protection rights
of indigent, pregnant women under the fourteenth24 5 or
fifth2 46 amendments of the U.S. Constitution.
Certain state courts have employed various constitutional
approaches to determine that an indigent woman has a
constitutional right to funding for an abortion. By expanding
the state constitutional guarantees of privacy or equal protec-
tion beyond those provided by the federal Constitution, a few
240. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
241. See id. at 152, 155.
242. 492 U.S. 490 (1989). In Webster, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the state's
interest, initially recognized in Roe, in protecting potential life. While Roe held that
such an interest becomes compelling at the point of fetal viability, 410 U.S. at 164,
Webster rejected the drawing of such a rigid line and implied that such compelling
interests exist throughout a woman's pregnancy. 492 U.S. at 519-20. Even so, the
Court left undisturbed Roe's prohibition against unconstitutionally infringing upon
"the right to an abortion derived from the Due Process Clause" and reaffirmed Roe's
holding that criminalizing all abortions was such an unconstitutional infringement
on that right. Id. at 521.
243. The state may intervene, however, by requiring physicians to perform
viability tests upon the fetus. See Webster, 492 U.S. at 519-20.
244. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-18 (1980) (upholding an amendment
to a federal appropriations bill that banned using federal Medicaid funds to pay for
abortions except where necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman); Maher v.
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469-80 (1977) (upholding a Pennsylvania law limiting Medicaid
funding for abortions so that only "medically necessary" abortions would be funded).
245. Maher, 432 U.S. at 470-80.
246. Harris, 448 U.S. 321-26.
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state courts have acted to ensure the provision of Medicaid
funding for indigent women seeking abortions as well as for
those desiring to carry their pregnancies to term. Women who
have access to abortion funding have the opportunity to make
a meaningful reproductive choice without suffering the
physical and financial hardships borne by their counterparts
in other states. Women in all states must be protected to
ensure that their procreative decisions are products of free
choice. The model statute and constitutional amendments
proposed in this Note would help safeguard women's funda-
mental freedoms.

